In 2004 one of the biggest ferry operators in Norway was found guilty of having intentionally attempted to defraud the state of about NOK 113 million in subsidies by underreporting revenues and overstating costs during the period 1992-2002. The company and five of the top managers were convicted and the case was regarded as one of the most serious subsidy offences ever committed in Norway. The aim of this article is to show that standardized revenue-and cost norms models from the state can deter operators from committing such offences and when relevant detect the fraud attempts at an early stage. Our model suggests that the operator in question overstated costs by about 19 per cent and that the actual subsidy fraud attempt was about three times higher than concluded by the Court.
INTRODUCTION
In Norway, as in many other countries, the public transport authorities' pecuniary compensation to the operators for running scheduled transport on non-profit routes is based on expected total operating costs (gross contracts) and expected subsidy needs (net contracts). The subsidies given to each operator are determined either through negotiations or competitive tendering. According to Bekken et al. (2006) net contracts constituted 90 per cent of all bus services procured on a negotiated basis in Norway in 2005 whilst tendering usually implies gross contracts. Even though competitive tendering has gradually become more popular for the provision of transport services in Norway (Mathisen and Solvoll, 2008) , negotiations still play a major role. The negotiations between the operators and the authorities are partly based on every operator's reported revenues and costs, and partly on standardized revenue-and cost models (SRC-models) developed by the authorities. As far as the local bus and fast craft services are concerned, net contracts have been used and the operators have received their subsidies from the county councils. To our knowledge neither county has developed SRC-models for fast craft transport, but such models became increasingly more important for bus transport during the 1980's. 3 In 1991, for example, 10 of the 19 county authorities in Norway actively used SRC-models during negotiation processes
The direct relationship between the subsidy level on the one hand and reported operating costs and revenue on the other hand, encourages the operators to overstate costs and to understate revenues with the aim of increasing the subsidy grant. The less the operators perceive that DR knows about their true costs and revenues, the less they perceive the probability of being detected if giving incorrect information and, consequently, the more tempting they find it to swindle DR. When the ferry operators, on the other hand, know that the authorities possess accurate knowledge about the industry's revenue-and cost structure through SRC-models, they are less likely to report inaccurate values because they perceive the probability of detection as being high. Consequently, the use of SRC-models does have a deterrent effect. 4 It is also worth noting that SRC-models are useful for the authorities under a tendering regime; the models enable them to weed out unrealistic tenders and thus reduce the problem of the "winners curse". The models will, thus, encourage transport operators to submit thoroughly prepared tenders. Norwegian kroner (NOK) 5 and the revenue from passengers and vehicles was about 1300 million NOK. This resulted in subsidy requirement of 1600 million NOK (Jørgensen et al., 2005) . For a more thorough review of the cost structure of the Norwegian ferries, we refer to Jørgensen et al. (2004) and Mathisen (2008) .
The importance of the ferry sector in the Norwegian transport system combined with high subsidy transfers to the sector, resulted in great media publicity when it was disclosed in November 2002 that one of the largest ferry companies in Norway, Ofoten og Vesteraalens Dampskibsselskab ASA (OVDS), had intentionally manipulated its accounting figures and in this way defrauded DR of several million NOK during the period 1994-2002. The aim of this article is to use the OVDS case to demonstrate how the use of simple SRC-models could have disclosed significant deviations from expected revenues and costs so that the subsidy fraud could have been revealed and hindered.
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the OVDS-case.
Section 3 presents our data sources and develops simple revenue-and cost models to illustrate how use of them could have revealed the fraud. In section 4 we briefly compare our results with the court's verdict. Finally, in section 5 we offer some concluding remarks.
THE OVDS CASE AND TRIAL
In July 2002 a former managing director in OVDS hinted to DR that he and other top managers in OVDS had swindled them for years by manipulating the company's accounting figures. In practice, the company operated with two sets of accounts, making it difficult to reveal the fraud both for the auditor and the transport authorities. This resulted in DR in November 2002 made a formal complaint to the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) putting the case that OVDS had manipulated its accounting figures for over a decade. ØKOKRIM continued the investigation and decided to charge OVDS for subsidy fraud. The offence was soon characterized as the worse subsidy fraud ever committed in Norway, and the case received, as mentioned earlier, extensive media publicity. For a more thorough description of the verdict, we refer to Salten District Court (2004) . had poor management control systems -since they were not able to reveal and hinder the fraud at an earlier stage. In fact, if a former top director had not informed of the fraud, it is uncertain whether the offence would ever have been discovered. The defenders continued the company's defence by arguing that clearly, the absence of use of SRC-norms and/or incomplete such norms, did not enable DR to check for and react on significant deviations in reported revenue-and cost figures. Consequently, the more influence OVDS's manipulated accounting figures had on the outcome of the negotiations, the poorer was DR's control system. DR could, thus, not at the same time argue that the misreported figures had a great impact on the subsidy given, and that they did indeed have a proper management control system. The Court finally decided that yearly increase in subsidies given to OVDS due to incorrect reported accountant figures amounted to about 70 per cent of the overstated subsidy needs. 6 The judgement cost OVDS in total about 72 million NOK, of which 6.3 million NOK were fine and legal costs and 65.7 million NOK was compensation to the state. All five members of the top management were indicted for having participated in the fraud. They admitted that their actions had led to incorrect reported revenue-and cost figures, but only two of them said that they had done this intentionally. Despite this, all were found guilty of subsidy fraud and imprisoned for periods ranging from 9 months to 42 months, with the unconditional imprisonment period varying from 3 months to 16 months.
The enforcement authorities preferred, thus, to penalize both the company (shareholders) and the top managers. To our knowledge, this was the first time in Norway that members of a company's top management have been imprisoned, even though the court could not prove that they had directly benefited personally. The verdict was therefore of great interest among the lawyers, in that it might offer precedence for similar cases in the future. Whether the enforcement authorities' best strategy is to penalize the company rather than the employees in order to prevent corporate crime is an important issue in the theoretical literature on the economics of crime, see for example Alexander (2004) .
THE REVENUE-AND COST MODELS

The Revenue Models
Let the annual fare revenues obtained from passenger and vehicle transport from ferry service i (R ip and R iv respectively) be specified by the following linear functions:
in which N is the number of services. X i1 and P i represents the number of passenger car equivalents (PCE) and the number of passengers transported over service i, respectively. PCE is a compound measure using one passenger car shorter than 6 meters as numeraire. 7 X i2 is the length of service i. Consequently, (X i1 X i2 ) and (P i X i2 ) denote the number of PCE-km and passenger-km travelling on service i, respectively. D i1 describes whether service i is run by OVDS (D i1 = 1) or not (D i1 = 0). Finally q i and u i are random error terms which are assumed to have traditional properties; expected value of zero and normally and independently distributed.
According to the Norwegian ferry fare system for passengers and cars decided by DR and described in Jørgensen et al. (2004) , fares are strictly regulated according to a nationwide scheme and cross-subsidy between services or vehicle categories is not allowed. It is, thus, reasonable to assume a positive linear relationship between revenues on the one hand and the above production measures on the other hand where a 0p , a 0v ≈ 0 and a 1p , a 2p , a 1v , a 2v > 0.
Even though the fare schemes imply a close relationship between revenues and the productions measures in (1) and (2), there are some stochastic effects arising from inaccurate revenue reports from the ferry companies and from the fact that the proportion of discounted fares may vary across ferry services. Moreover, according to the court's conclusions, OVDS understated revenues during the period 1992-2001 except for the years 1996, 1999 and 2000. This indicates that a 3p = a 3v = 0 for these three years and (a 3p + a 3v ) < 0 for the other years. 8 After the point in time that OVDS became suspected of subsidy fraud, it is reasonable to assume that the company stopped committing such offences implying that a 3p = a 3v = 0 after 2002.
The cost model
In accordance with Jørgensen et al. (2004) , we assume that the cost structure of the ferry industry can be specified by the following modified translog cost function: 9 (3) It is worth noting that 100b 5 and 100b 6 denote the percentage changes in costs when D i1 and D i2 increase from 0 to 1, respectively, see for example Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995) . If the authorities' accusations made against OVDS were correct, b 5 > 0 before 2002, whereas b 5 ≈ 0 after the fraud was detected, providing that OVDS operates approximately as effectively as the other ferry companies. Since technical and safety demands for ferries operating in unsheltered stretches of open sea are considerably higher than for those only sailing in sheltered waters, it is reasonable to assume that b 6 > 0.
Furthermore, it can be deduced from (3) that if the marginal costs for the ferry operators of carrying one PCE are positive and increase with trip length ( 
Data sources
Our analysis is based on reported accounting and output data from ferry services operated by 21 ferry companies from 1996 to 2000, and from 2003 to 2005. The data set, thus, includes observations for 5 years before and for three years after OVDS's fraud was disclosed. 10 Except for one service in which two of the ports of call are situated near each other and far away from the third port, we have omitted the services with more than two ports of call. The reason for doing this is that the reported value of average trip length per PCE (X i2 ) is rather inaccurate for such services. Moreover, we have omitted services in year t which were discontinued during year t. This implies that our data set contains about half of the total number of ferry services in Norway.
(Insert Table 1 about here) Table 1 shows that the yearly number of services included in the data set has fallen from 67 in 1996 to 51 in 2005. This is mainly caused by a reduction in the number of ferry services in Norway during this period. Revenues from passenger transport stand for about 28 per cent of total revenues. The average length of the ferry services has remained fairly constant at about 8 km during the 9 year period. During the same time period the average values of costs and PCE have increased steadily, indicating greater transport activity on the services over time. It is also worth noting that OVDS runs 12 ferry services in total and that the data set contains the same 6 OVDS services for all years. The proportion of OVDS services varies, thus, from 9 per cent in 1996 to 12 per cent in 2005. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the proportion of services whose ferries operate in unsheltered stretches of open sea varies from 18 per cent to 23 per cent.
Estimation results
The revenue models
Estimating the linear revenues models (1) and (2) using OLS produced residual plots and standard tests which did not meet the desired standard properties fully; their expected values are zero but some heteroskedasticity does occur. Trying standard remedies to moderate this problem by deflating the equations by one of the explanatory variables (see for example Maddala (1992) ) did not help much. Despite this, F-values and adjusted R 2 values above 400 and 0.95 respectively for all years indicate that the models do capture well the variations in revenues from passenger and vehicle transport among the ferry services, see Table 2 and   Table 3 . A further examination of the results shows that a 0p and a 0v are not different from zero at a 10 per cent significance level, whilst a 1p , a 2p , a 1v and a 2v are all highly significantly positive for all years. The findings do thus support our a priori assumptions.
As far as the OVDS verdict is concerned, the estimated values of a 3p and a 3v are not significantly different from zero for any years. More importantly, neither a 3p nor a 3v are significantly negative in 1997 and 1998; that is for the two years in our data set for which OVDS was accused for revenue underreporting. This means that our results do not indicate that OVDS has understated revenues during the period in question on the six services in our data set. Since the Court did not take into consideration whether OVDS underreported revenues to a larger extent on some services than others, one reasonable conclusion is, then, that our estimations are in accordance with the Court's conclusions for the years 1996, 1999 and 2000, but in conflict with the verdict for the years 1997 and 1998. It is, however, worth noting that according to the accusation brought against OVDS, the magnitudes of the revenue manipulation were small; they stand for only 4.6 per cent of the overstating of subsidy needs for these two years.
(Insert Table 2 Table 3 about here)
The cost model
Estimating the translog cost function in (3) using OLS showed that b 3 did not significantly deviate from zero for any year. We therefore removed the squared explanatory variable Based on the above reasoning, the magnitudes of the overstated costs in year t for all the 6 OVDS services included in our data set (OC t ) can be estimated using the following formula: Table 5 about here)
COMPARING THE MODEL RESULTS WITH THE COURT'S VERDICT
Since the revenue models did not provide significant values of the parameter indicating whether or not OVDS has understated revenues (a 3p and a 3v ) for any year, we have disregarded their estimated values in Table 6 .
As previously emphasized, the verdict provides no information about whether OVDS's defraud attempt was linked to particular services or not. In the following calculations, we therefore assume that OVDS overstated the costs for the other ferry services with the same percentage as for those included in our data set. Furthermore, the total reported costs of running all the 12 OVDS's services are estimated to be about 60 per cent higher for every year than for those services included in the data set. 13 It follows then that OVDS's total overstatement of costs, TOC t , for every year t in Table 6 can be found by multiplying the figures in Table 5 by 1.60. Table 6 shows, that our model estimations indicate far higher figures of overstated costs for all years than the Court did. Except for the year 1998, we can conclude that the Court's verdict gives too low subsidy fraud amounts at 7 per cent significant level or better. The overstatement of costs during the period 1995-2000 amounts to 165 million NOK. These estimations are over 3 times as high as the Court's estimates. A closer look at the figures in Table 6 shows that the annual correlation between the magnitudes of the Court's and the model's estimates of cost overstatement are low; relatively speaking the differences in these estimates are highest for the years 1996 and 1997.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
The critical question is, of course, whether OVDS overstated the costs for the other ferry services with about the same percentage as for those included in our data set. We find no reason to believe that OVDS's reporting procedures have differed to any great extent for these two groups of ferry services. If so, the Court has greatly underestimated the magnitudes of OVDS's cost manipulations. In this respect, it is worth noting that, according to accepted juridical and accounting principles, the defendant can only be found guilty for amounts which the Court can prove without doubt. This suggests lower estimates than we have found.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how the use of standardized revenue-and cost norm models based on the transport operators' reported accountant figures to the authorities can be used to reveal inaccurate information from the transport operators. The article uses the accusation against one of the biggest Norwegian ferry company (OVDS) as a starting point. If we accept that OVDS's higher reported costs are due to fraud and that OVDS also used the same reporting procedures for the services not included in our data set, the company attempted to swindle the state for about 165 million NOK in 2006 prices during the five year period from 1996 to 2000. Even though our model acquits OVDS for revenue understatement, the magnitude of the swindle attempt in our model is over 3 times higher than the conclusions given in the court verdict.
It is also important to note that we only compare the court's conclusions with revenue-and cost models for the five year period 1996 -2000. According to the verdict, the subsidy fraud attempted in this period accounts for only about 38 per cent of the total fraud attempt.
Bearing this and the results in Table 6 in mind, this indicates that the subsidy amount actually received illegally by OVDS far exceeded the sum of 63 million NOK estimated by the Court.
Summing up, if the authorities had used a similar cost model presented in this article when negotiating with the ferry companies, the partners would have had less asymmetric information about the cost structure in the ferry industry, and the authorities would most likely have been able to reveal OVDS's fraud attempt at an earlier stage. Moreover, when the ferry operators know that their negotiators use such models, they are less likely to manipulate the accounts. In this way, such models have a significant deterrent effect.
by the expected penalty alone, see for example Polinsky and Shavell (2007) . It follows that
. P and F are thus complementary deterrent means; the higher the value of one of them, the more deterrent effect has a change in the other one.
5. 1€ ≈ 9 NOK 6. The verdict does not specify the details behind the calculation of 69.6 per cent, but argues that it is a well founded approximation of the misreported accounting figures influence on subsidies because it is based on extensive studies of costs and revenues in combination with statements from witnesses. 7. A detailed description of the PCE production measure is given in Solvoll (1997) . 12. Let * t C be the true costs for OVDS in year t. This implies that
13. This means that the reported costs of running the 6 ferry services included in our data set account for about 60 per cent of OVDS's total reported ferry costs. 
